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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Despite the claim that RICO has become a method for redressing
virtually all means of wrongdoing, not just a weapon against the activities
of the archetypal, intimidating mobster," the first federal prosecutorial use
of RICO against purveyors of obscene materials 45 in Pryba has successfully
supplemented the federal prosecutorial arsenal in combatting obscenity. In
1984, Congress expanded that arsenal, previously limited to obscenity viol-
ations under 18 U.S.C. sections 1460-1469 (1988), by expanding RICO to
cover obscene- materials in response to a concern that organized crime was
contributing to and profiting from an "explosion in the volume and avail-
ability of pornography in our society." 46 The Pryba court concluded that
Congress' decision to allow the use of RICO against obscenity violates
neither the First Amendment right of free speech nor the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines. As
a result, federal prosecutors in the Fourth Circuit may now use RICO's
stiffer penalties and forfeiture provisions against sellers and distributors of
obscene materials.
CIVIL AND CRIMNAL PROCEDURE
For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in accor-
dance with the commands of the Due Process Clause, the defendant must
have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to ensure that the
exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.47 When a court asserts personal jurisdiction over a
if defendant agreed to participate in at least two predicate acts implicitly was not adding
element to RICO conspiracy), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Winter, 663
F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983).
44. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. V. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. 1300, 1306-10
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (recognizing expanded use of RICO). See generally, Comment, What Have
They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court Takes the Racketeering Requirement Out of
Racketeering, 35 AM. U.L. RPv. 821, 867-68 (1986) (criticizing expansion of use of RICO).
45. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. State, 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989) (finding that obscenity
violations could serve as predicate offenses under Indiana RICO statute); Western Business
Systems, Inc. v. Slaton, 492 F. Supp. 513, 515 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (upholding use of state RICO
statute and forfeiture provisions against alleged purveyors of sexually explicit material despite
First Amendment challenges); 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d 559, 564 (Ind. 1987)
(same); State v. Feld, 155 Ariz. 88, -, 745 P.2d 146, 152-53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(upholding use of some state RICO forfeiture provisions against purveyors of sexually explicit
materials but striking down portions unconnected with racketeering activity).
46. S. 434, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., 130 CoNo. REc. 5434 (Jan. 30, 1984) (remarks of
Senator Helms); See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) (stating that RICO's
purpose is to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for assault upon organized crime
and its economic roots).
47. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (formulating
minimum contacts test). Although the Supreme Court has variously described the appropriate
inquiry for determining the constitutionality of a court's attempted exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant, the Court has noted that the minimum contacts standard remains
the "constitutional touchstone" for personal jurisdiction. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). Thus, due process protects individual defendants from binding in
personam judgments of forums with which the defendants lack meaningful relations. Id. at
471-72.
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nonresident defendant in a cause of action arising out of the defendant's
contact with the forum state, the court exercises specific jurisdiction s.4  A
court's exercise of specific jurisdiction is constitutionally acceptable if the
defendant purposefully directs the defendant's activities at residents of the
forum state, and the litigation results from injuries arising out of or relating
to the defendant's activities. 49 When a court asserts personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant in a cause of action not arising out of the
defendant's contact with the forum state, the court exercises general juris-
diction.50 A court's exercise of general jurisdiction is constitutionally ac-
ceptable if the defendant's contacts with the forum state are continuous
and systematic."' Once a party demonstrates that a nonresident defendant
has purposefully established requisite minimum contacts with the forum
state, the court must then consider the contacts in light of other factors to
ascertain whether exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable in light of
notions of fair play and substantial justice . 2 If the defendant demonstrates
48. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1983)
(defining specific jurisdiction).
49. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (describing constitutionally acceptable exercise of
specific jurisdiction).
The purposefulness of a nonresident defendant's conduct is of critical importance in
determining whether the defendant has the requisite minimum contacts to support a court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has noted that the "unilateral activity"
of a party other than a defendant is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of minimum contact
with the forum state. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Instead, the nonresident
defendant must do some act to "purposefully avaigl]" itself of the privilege of acting within
the forum state and to invoke the benefits and protections of the forum state's laws. Id. The
"purposeful availment" requirement protects a defendant from being "haled into a jurisdic-
tion" as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts with the jurisdiction or as a
result of the "unilateral activity" of a party within the jurisdiction. Burger King, 471 U.S. at
475 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)); World Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980); and Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417).
The Court has held that a nonresident corporate defendant's delivery of products into the
stream of commerce in an attempt to serve the market in the forum state and with an
expectation that the products would be purchased by consumers in the forum state constitutes
purposeful availment justifying the forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction. World Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. The Court, however, has refused to find purposeful availment
in a defendant's delivery of products into the stream of commerce without "something more"
indicating an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum state. Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion). Examples of conduct
indicating an intent to serve the market in the forum state would be designing a product for
the market in the forum state and advertising or marketing the product in the forum state.
Id.
50. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9 (defining general jurisdiction).
51. See id. at 415-16 (stating that nonresident defendant's contacts with forum state must
be continuous and systematic to support exercise of general jurisdiction).
52. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985) (describing
necessary reasonableness analysis after minimum contacts inquiry). The Burger King Court
suggested the following relevant considerations to determining the reasonableness of a court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction: the burden on the defendant; the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;
the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies.
Id. at 477.
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that the forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction would make litigation
so difficult for the defendant that the defendant would be at a "severe
disadvantage" in comparison to the defendant's opponent, then due process
will preclude the forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.53 Against this background, in Federal Insurance Company v.
Lake Shore, Inc., 886 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1989), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina constitutionally could exercise
personal jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturers of a ship and cargo
winch that allegedly malfunctioned and caused damage while the ship was
docked in Charleston, South Carolina.
In Federal the plaintiff, Federal Insurance Company (Federal), a New
Jersey corporation, paid a $322,543.46 claim of its insured, General Electric
Company, for damage to a turbine accessory base. The turbine accessory
base incurred the damage when a cargo winch allegedly malfunctioned while
loading the base aboard the vessel M.V. Paul Bunyon in Charleston, South
Carolina. Peterson Builders, Incorporated (Peterson), a defendant, manu-
factured the M.V. Paul Bunyon. Peterson is a Wisconsin corporation with
its principal place of business in Wisconsin. Lake Shore, Incorporated (Lake
Shore), also a defendant, manufactured the cargo winch installed on the
M.V. Paul Bunyon that was involved in the incident. Lake Shore is a
Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. As
the subrogated insurer of General Electric, Federal sued both Lake Shore
and Peterson in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina. Federal invoked the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
district court and alleged causes of action for negligence, strict liability, and
breach of express and implied warranties arising out of the incident. The
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the action for lack
of personal jurisdiction, and Federal appealed.
Before considering Federal's arguments, the Fourth Circuit noted that
because Congress has not authorized nationwide service of process in
admiralty cases, South Carolina's long-arm statute must provide the statu-
tory basis for an assertion of jurisdiction over Lake Shore and Peterson.
Relying on Triplett v. R.M. Wade & Co., 261 S.C. 419, 200 S.E.2d 375
(1973), the Federal court noted that the South Carolina long-arm statute
extends jurisdiction "to the outer limits" of due process. Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the state law and due process analyses were
identical and proceeded to address the question of the constitutionality of
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Lake Shore and Peterson by the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.
Federal's first argument on appeal was that Lake Shore and Peterson
should be subject to the jurisdiction of the district court because the
defendants placed defective products that ultimately caused injury in the
53. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (describing due process preclusion of exercise of
personal jurisdiction when unreasonably disadvantageous for nonresident defendant).
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"stream of commerce" that terminated in South Carolina. Federal thus
argued that the inevitability of the M.V. Paul Bunyon docking in various
ports, including Charleston, justified the district court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Lake Shore and Peterson. The Fourth Circuit, however,
disagreed. Quoting World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
295 (1980), the Fourth Circuit noted that the mere foreseeability of a
product entering a forum has never been a "sufficient benchmark" for
personal jurisdiction in accordance with due process. The Federal court
recognized that the United States Supreme Court had stated in World Wide
Volkswagen that a forum could assert personal jurisdiction over a nonres-
ident corporate defendant that delivered products into the stream of com-
merce with the expectation that consumers within the forum state would
purchase the products. The Fourth Circuit, however, relied on Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), and emphasized the necessity of the
defendant committing some act to purposefully avail itself of the privilege
of conducting business within the forum and to invoke the benefits and
protection of the forum's laws.
Applying the law to the case at hand, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that Federal had failed to demonstrate that Lake Shore and Peterson
"purposefully availed" themselves of the privilege of conducting business
in South Carolina. The Federal court noted that neither Lake Shore nor
Peterson maintained offices or held licenses to do business in South Caro-
lina. Nor did either defendant have agents, employees, or subsidiaries in
the state. The Fourth Circuit further noted that neither Lake Shore nor
Peterson maintained a bank account or owned real or personal property in
South Carolina, and neither defendant directly advertised or solicited cus-
tomers in the state. The Federal court recognized that, after the accrual of
Federal's cause of action, Lake Shore had made sales to South Carolina
residents, and Peterson had sent employees to South Carolina to perform
warranty work on a Navy vessel stationed in Charleston. The Fourth Circuit
noted, however, that customers within South Carolina had initiated and
directed these contacts, and such contacts did not result from the defendants'
direct or indirect commercial activities in the South Carolina market for
cargo winches or ocean going vessels. Because Lake Shore and Peterson
had no control over the M.V. Paul Bunyon after the ship's owners purchased
the ship, the M.V. Paul Bunyon's presence in South Carolina was merely
fortuitous. The Federal court reasoned that a general "stream of commerce"
theory of personal jurisdiction cannot replace the requirement that a defen-
dant purposefully avail itself of forum law. Because Lake Shore and
Peterson had not purposefully directed their activities at South Carolina,
the Fourth Circuit held that a "stream of commerce" theory of personal
jurisdiction did not apply to grant the district court personal jurisdiction
over the defendants in Federal's claim. The Fourth Circuit also noted that
Lake Shore's and Peterson's contacts with South Carolina could not fairly
be described as "continuous and systematic" to support the district court's
exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendants in accordance with the
rule in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1983).
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Federal also argued on appeal that the mobility of ocean going vessels
should distinguish such vessels for jurisdictional purposes. Federal argued
that because ships are designed to travel between ports in different states
and nations, and because shipbuilding consequently seeks to serve the market
in all states containing major ports, a manufacturer of an ocean going
vessel should be amenable to suit wherever the manufacturer's product
docks. The Fourth Circuit, however, again disagreed with Federal. The
Federal court noted that the United States Supreme Court rejected an
argument based on the mobility of automobiles and refused to adopt a
product-by-product approach to personal jurisdiction in World Wide Volk-
swagen. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that all products are mobile to some
extent and that a product-by-product approach to personal jurisdiction
would force courts to draw meaningless distinctions between products,
thereby undermining predictability in structuring business dealings. Conse-
quently, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the relevant inquiry for jurisdic-
tional purposes is the nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum
state and not the characteristics of the defendant's products.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the lack of overall reasona-
bleness in the district court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Lake
Shore and Peterson constituted an independent ground for dismissing Fed-
eral's claim. The Federal court noted that the overall reasonableness of a
court's exercise of jurisdiction depends on the burden on the defendant,
the interests of the forum state, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief in
the chosen forum, and the interstate judicial system's interest in the efficient
resolution of controversies and furtherance of fundamental substantive social
policies. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Lake Shore and Peterson would
bear a substantial burden defending in South Carolina. Because Federal and
its insured are not residents of South Carolina, the Federal court reasoned
that both Federal's interest in the forum and the forum's interest in the
dispute were minimal. Concluding that the district court's exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendants would be both unreasonable and
unfair and would violate due process, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision dismissing Federal's claim for want of personal
jurisdiction.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Federal, refusing to find personal
jurisdiction when a defendant delivers products into the "stream of com-
merce" without additional activities, follows established personal jurisdiction
doctrine. 54 The court's refusal to base personal jurisdiction on the charac-
54. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 297, 295 (1980) (stating
that mere foreseeability that product will enter forum is not "sufficient benchmark" for
personal jurisdiction under Due Process Clause); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) (stating that defendant's delivery of product into
stream of commerce without "something more" indicating intent or purpose to serve market
for product in forum state is insufficient basis for exercise of personal jurisdiction); DeJames
v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that foreseeability
that product will enter forum is insufficient basis for assertion of personal jurisdiction).
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teristics of the defendant's product instead of the nature of the defendant's
contacts with the forum also is consistent with prior cases.5 Consequently,
the Federal decision represents a consistent exposition of existing law rather
than a significant change in the law of personal jurisdiction.
In Louisiana Public Services Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986), the
United States Supreme Court concluded that a federal statute will preempt
state law when Congress expresses a clear intent to preempt state law, when
an actual conflict between state and federal law is present, or where
compliance with both federal and state law is effectively impossible. 6 The
Court further noted that a federal statute will preempt state law where there
is implicit in the federal statute an intention to bar state regulation, where
comprehensive federal regulation has occupied an entire field of law, or
where a state law interferes with the accomplishment and execution of the
full objectives of Congress in enacting the statute. s 7 The Supremacy Clause
of Article VI of the United States Constitution provides the authority for
federal preemption of state law.
58
In 1947, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),5 9 which
provided for the enforceability of arbitration agreements within contracts
affecting interstate commerce. Courts, however, could set aside an arbitra-
tion agreement within a contract when contract principles disallowed en-
forcement of the provision.60 In 1988, Virginia enacted a statute requiring
contracts between automobile manufacturers and dealers to contain a clause
to declare invalid any contractual provisions that denied access to the
procedures and forums of Virginia. 6' While the FAA contains no specific
preemption provision, the Fourth Circuit held, in Supak & Sons Manufac-
turing Company v. Pervel Industries Inc., 593 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1979),
that the FAA preempted conflicting state laws which restrict the validity or
enforceability of arbitration agreements. The Supak court addressed the
question of whether general contract principles could render an arbitration
clause invalid. Holding that the FAA only governed contractually agreed
upon arbitration provisions, the Supak court asserted that the FAA did not
55. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (focusing on nature of defendant's contacts with
forum in personal jurisdiction inquiry); World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 296-97 n.11 (1980) (refusing to adopt product-by-product approach to personal jurisdic-
tion); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that
court must focus on defendant's conduct in personal jurisdiction inquiry).
56. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 368-69 (1986).
57. Id.
58. Id. See U.S. CoNST. art. VI.
59. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1990).
60. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (providing for validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate except when grounds exist for revocation of any contract).
61. See Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-550.527(10) (1988) (repealed 1989), reenacted Va. Code
Ann. § 46.2-1569(9) (1990).
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
displace state law governing general principles of contract formation.62 The
United States Supreme Court, however, in Southland Corporation v. Keat-
ing, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), held that the FAA preempts a state statute if the
statute, on its face or as applied, imposes burdens on arbitration agreements
that do not apply to contracts generally.63 The Southland Court emphasized
the Congressional purpose to support arbitration and prohibit state attempts
to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed
Virginia's attempt to undercut the enforceability of arbitration in Saturn
Distribution Corporation v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1991). The Fourth Circuit considered whether the
FAA preempted Virginia Code section 46.1-550.5:27, which prohibits au-
tomobile manufacturers and dealers from entering into agreements contain-
ing mandatory alternative dispute resolution provisions. The plaintiff, Saturn
Distribution Corporation (Saturn), was created in 1985 to design, market,
and manufacture a new line of automobiles. As part of Saturn's manufac-
turing and marketing policy, Saturn required all contracts with dealers to
contain mandatory binding arbitration provisions. Saturn's "Dealer Agree-
ment" contained these provisions. When Saturn submitted the Dealer Agree-
ment to the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles
(Commissioner), the Commissioner refused to approve the Dealer Agree-
ment. Applying Virginia Code sections 46.1-550.5:24, 27, the Commissioner
would not approve the Dealer Agreement unless the Dealer Agreement
contained a provision to opt out of the binding arbitration provisions.
Saturn sued the Commissioner, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and
claiming that the FAA preempted the Virginia statute that prohibited
mandatory arbitration clauses.
In the lower court proceedings, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, in Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 717
F.Supp. 1147 (E.D. Va. 1989), held that the FAA did not preempt the
Virginia statute. The district court reasoned that because the Virginia statute
affected the formation of arbitration agreements rather than the enforcement
of existing arbitration agreements, the statute did not conflict with the
purposes and objectives of Congress as enacted in the FAA. The district
court further reasoned that the Virginia statute did not single out arbitration
agreements, but rather affected a much broader general area of contract
law. The district court concluded that the Virginia statute, by ensuring
consensual rather than forced arbitration, was entirely in harmony with the
FAA.
62. Id.; see, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967);
Duplan Corp. (Duplan Yarn Division) v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F.Supp. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
63. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16-17 n. 11 (1984). See H.R. RP. No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924) (indicating congressional intent to require enforcement of
arbitration agreements equally with enforcement of other contracts).
64. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
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Saturn appealed the decision of the district court, arguing that the
district court erred in holding the Virginia statute valid. To resolve the
issue, the Fourth Circuit first stated that the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI of the United States Constitution provides Congress with the power to
preempt state law. The Fourth Circuit then cited Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941), for the proposition that federal law preempts state law
when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Looking to the legislative
history of the FAA, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress enacted
the FAA to promote the enforceability of arbitration agreements and to
make arbitration a more viable option to parties wishing to avoid the costs
of litigation. The Fourth Circuit, citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), also stated that Congress
intended the FAA to promote arbitration, notwithstanding any state sub-
stantive or procedural policies to the contrary. In view of the FAA's
requirement that states place no greater restriction on arbitration provisions
than states place on other contractual terms, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that when a state law singles out arbitration agreements and limits the
enforceability of those agreements, the FAA preempts the state law.
The Commissioner argued that the Virginia statute did not limit the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, but rather only limited the for-
mation of arbitration agreements. Attempting to limit the preemptive effect
of the FAA, the Commissioner contended that the FAA only applied to
existing arbitration agreements and, therefore, the FAA's preemption could
not reach legislation affecting the formation of arbitration agreements. The
Fourth Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of the Commissioner, stating
that the FAA had a broader preemptive effect. The Fourth Circuit asserted
that Congress intended to foreclose all state attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements. The Fourth Circuit concluded that
courts should not allow states to avoid the enforceability requirements of
the FAA by banning arbitration agreements altogether.
Concluding that the FAA preempted a ban on the formation of arbi-
tration agreements, the Fourth Circuit determined that the FAA preempted
the Virginia statute. Acknowledging that the FAA would not preempt the
Virginia statute if the Virginia statute applied equally to arbitration agree-
ments and other contracts, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the Virginia
statute applied unequally. Because Virginia law allowed certain contract
terms to be nonnegotiable but disallowed nonnegotiable arbitration agree-
ments, the statute imposed burdens on arbitration agreements that Virginia
law did not impose on contracts generally. The Fourth Circuit determined
that the FAA preempted a law which unfairly burdened arbitration agree-
ments while not placing similar burdens on other contract provisions. The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, reversed the decision of the district court and
granted summary judgment to Saturn. The Fourth Circuit prohibited the
Commissioner from taking any action to restrict or discourage the use and
enforcement of the mandatory arbitration provision in the Saturn contracts.
Judge Widener dissented on the grounds that the Virginia legislature
has the power to protect its own citizens. Asserting that federal legislation
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is least preemptive when a court bases preemption on the fact that state
legislation frustrates federal policy, Judge Widener reasoned that the FAA
should only preempt statutes that affect existing arbitration agreements.
Judge Widener concluded that Congress designed the FAA to regulate the
enforceability of otherwise valid arbitration agreements and not the for-
mation of such agreements.
Given the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, 6 the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Saturn follows the rule that the FAA preempts all state statutes
banning the formation of contracts with nonnegotiable arbitration agree-
ments. As to FAA preemption of statutes banning nonnegotiable arbitration
provisions in other circuits, the case law on the issue is scarce. The First
Circuit, in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir.
1989), found Massachusetts regulations similar to those in Saturn preempted
by the FAA. The First Circuit held, as did the Saturn court, that Massa-
chusetts regulations making mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts be-
tween securities brokers unethical violated the congressional policy in the
FAA of encouraging arbitration. 66 Holding that a federal statute could
preempt state law where the state law interfered with congressional policy,
the First Circuit held the Massachusetts regulations invalid.67 Two district
court cases also support the proposition that the FAA's preemption is broad
based. In Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 752 F. Supp. 151
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) the United States District Court for the Southeri District
of New York acknowledged that Congress did not intend for the FAA to
preempt all state law in the field of arbitration.6 The Barbier court, however,
then stated that the FAA could preempt state law even where the state law
and the FAA conflicted indirectly. 69 The question, the Barbier court con-
cluded, was whether the state law would undermine the goals and policies
of the FAA.70 Thus, the Barbier court, in line with the Saturn court, implied
broad preemptive scope in the FAA. Further, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, in Securities Industry Ass'n v.
Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla. 1990), also held, on the same reasoning
as the Barbier court, that the FAA preempts any statute designed to interfere
with the ability of contracting parties to freely enter into arbitration agree-
ments.71 The case law, therefore, seems to indicate that the FAA not only
preempts statutes limiting the enforceability of arbitration agreements, but
65. 111 S. Ct. 516 (1991).
66. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1119 (Ist Cir. 1989).
67. Id. at 1124.
68. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 151, 160-61 n.15 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). See New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988)
(asserting that FAA does not preempt all state law).
69. Barber, 752 F. Supp. at 160-61 n.15.
70. Id. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford
Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989) (asserting preemption where state rule would
undermine goals and policies of FAA).
71. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205, 207 (S.D.Fla. 1990).
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also limits the power of states to regulate the formation of arbitration
agreements.
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(d) states that a "vol-
untary appearance by defendant is equivalent to personal service ......
Before the South Carolina legislature adopted the current rules, South
Carolina Code Section 15-9-70 (1976) contained a statement identical to the
portion of Rule 4(d) quoted above. Case law construing that code section
interpreted a voluntary appearance as equivalent to a general appearance,
which occurred whenever a defendant manifested an intent to be in court.
72
A special appearance under prior law was an appearance for the sole
purpose of contesting the court's jurisdiction.7 3 The present South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure retain only the voluntary, or general appearance
provision.74 South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2) states
that a defendant may assert the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by
motion or by responsive pleading. This creates what the Fourth Circuit, in
Maybin v. Northside Correctional Center, 891 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1989),
called a "paradox" in the South Carolina rules: If a defendant only can
make a general appearance, how can the defendant assert an objection to
personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) without simultaneously waiving ob-
jection to personal service under Rule 4(d)?
In Maybin the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered whether the defendant, Northside Correctional Center (the Cen-
ter), waived its objection to personal jurisdiction by making a "voluntary
appearance" before the district court, as that term is used in Rule 4(d) of
the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff in Maybin
instituted a civil action against the Center in South Carolina state court,
alleging racial discrimination. The Center thereafter removed the action to
the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, and
moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the district court lacked
personal jurisdiction over defendant. The defendant's motion cited the
plaintiff's failure to properly serve the defendant with the summons and
complaint as one ground for dismissal, and included arguments regarding
the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity.
The Magistrate recommended dismissing the complaint under the Elev-
enth Amendment and because of the plaintiff's failure to properly serve the
Center. The plaintiff filed exceptions to the Magistrate's Report and at-
tempted to cure the defect in service by serving the Administrator for the
Department of Corrections. The Center responded to the plaintiff's excep-
tions, asserting that service still was improper because the plaintiff did not
serve the defendant within the 120-day time limit imposed in Federal Rules
72. Stephens v. Ringling, 102 S.C. 333, 86 S.E. 683 (1915).
73. Security Management, Inc. v. Schoolfield Furniture Indus., Inc., 275 S.C. 466, 272
S.E.2d 638, 639 (1980).
74. See Dunbar v. Vandermore, 295 S.C. 493, 369 S.E.2d 150, 151 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that general appearance is only appearance party can make under existing law).
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of Civil Procedure Rule 4(j). Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Extend Time
to Serve Defendants, giving no reasons, however, for failure to serve
defendant within the time limit. The Magistrate then issued a second report
recommending dismissal of the complaint for failure to properly serve
defendant within the 120-day time period. The Magistrate also denied the
plaintiff's motion to extend time, ruling that the plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause for failing to timely serve the Center. Accepting
the Magistrate's recommendation; the district court dismissed the case based
solely upon the jurisdictional defect of insufficiency of service.
The plaintiff appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that any defects
in the service of process became irrelevant when the Center made a "vol-
untary appearance" in the district court. The plaintiff asserted that because
the Center included arguments regarding the timeliness of plaintiff's action,
the Eleventh Amendment, and sovereign immunity with its objection to
personal jurisdiction, the Center waived any objection to personal jurisdic-
tion. In resolving the issue, the Fourth Circuit first examined the plaintiff's
initial service of process under South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 4(d)(5). Rule 4(d)(5) governs service when the defendant is a state
agency or officer, and requires a plaintiff to deliver a copy of the summons
or complaint to the agency or officer and to send a copy of both documents
to the Attorney General. The court stated that to legally serve an agency,
a plaintiff must serve the required documents upon a person of suitable
position and discretion within the agency and, therefore, the plaintiff's
service upon an employee of the Center was ineffective. Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that plaintiff's initial
service of process was inadequate.
The Fourth Circuit next considered the paradox presented by South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 4(d) and 12(b) in determining
whether the Center had waived any objection to personal service when the
Center made a general appearance to object to personal jurisdiction. The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that courts must consider rules of civil procedure
in relation to one another and must construe the rules together. The court
stated that under Rule 12(b), a party should be able to raise an objection
to personal jurisdiction without simultaneously waiving that party's objec-
tion under 4(d).
The Fourth Circuit then examined how the South Carolina Court of
Appeals had dealt with the problem of elimination of a special appearance
to object to personal jurisdiction from the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. In Smalls v. Weed, 291 S.C. 258, 353 S.E.2d 154 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1987), the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that when a defendant
appeared and asserted two claims going to the merits of the action, in
addition to a jurisdictional objection, the defendant had waived personal
jurisdiction. In Dunbar v. Vandermore, 295 S.C. 493, 369 S.E.2d 150 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1988), the South Carolina Court of Appeals considered whether
the defendant in that case had waived the defendant's right to assert
jurisdictional defenses by requesting an extension of time prior to moving
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that
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the defendant had not waived the right to object to personal jurisdiction
under Rule 12(h)(1), which provides only two circumstances under which a
party waives that right: if the defendant omits the objection from the
motion, or the defendant fails to make the defense by motion, responsive
pleading or an amendment to the pleading. The Fourth Circuit observed
that, in light of Smalls, although the legislature had eliminated the term
"special appearance" from the South Carolina Rules, the legislature had
not entirely discarded the procedure described by the term. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that under Smalls and Dunbar, if a defendant appears
before the court to contest personal jurisdiction, and does not simultaneously
address the merits, the defendant has not waived any jurisdictional objection
under Rule 4(d).
Applying Smalls and Dunbar to the case at bar, the Fourth Circuit
found that none of the Center's arguments, including the objection to
personal jurisdiction, went to the merits of the action, implicitly acknowl-
edging jurisdiction of the court. The court observed that the timeliness,
Eleventh Amendment, and sovereign immunity arguments were jurisdictional
issues. The Fourth Circuit determined that the Center did not waive personal
jurisdiction merely because the Center alerted the court to other types of
jurisdictional defects. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision
of the district court.
Maybin reconciles the inconsistency between South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure Rules 4(d) and 12(b). The Fourth Circuit decision resolves
the confusion generated by the elimination of the special appearance from
South Carolina law by focusing on the procedural aspects of the special
appearance rather than the appearance in the law of the term itself.
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 68) establishes
the guidelines by which parties contemplating litigation may agree to a
judgment. 5 The defending party may extend an offer of judgment to the
opposing party. The complaining party then has ten days to accept the
offer by written notice to the defending party. Rule 68 does not address
squarely the possibility of a party revoking its offer of judgment during the
ten day acceptance period. Several authorities have concluded that offers
made pursuant to Rule 68 are irrevocable for ten days after the offer.76 In
75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. Rule 68 states, in pertinent part:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a
claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in
the offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer
the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may
then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof
and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed
withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine
costs....
Id.
76. See Radecki v. Amoco Oil Co., 858 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1988) (assuming for
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Colonial Penn Insurance Company v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1989),
the Fourth Circuit considered whether a party could revoke its offer during
the ten day acceptance period under Rule 68 if the party based its offer on
the offeree's fraudulent behavior.
A second, unrelated issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether the
court should take judicial notice of the outcome of a state court case
involving the same issue as that on appeal. Rule 201(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence allows for judicial notice of a fact that is capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to reasonably accurate sources.
77
Normally, an appellate court will not consider facts that were not part of
the record before the district court. 78 While hesitant to employ Rule 201 on
a regular basis, appellate courts recognize that, in appropriate circumstances,
courts should take notice of facts beyond the appellate record in the interest
of justice. 79 In Colonial Penn the Fourth Circuit considered whether it
should take notice of an insured party's guilty plea to arson in state court
when that same party sought, before the Fourth Circuit, to enforce the
insurance company's offer of judgment to pay for the fire damage.
In Colonial Penn the Colonial Penn Insurance Company (Colonial Penn)
insured the defendants', Mr. and Mrs. Coils' (the Coils), home against fire.
In 1987 the Coils' home suffered severe fire damage. The Coils demanded
payment from Colonial Penn under their insurance policy, but Colonial
Penn refused to settle the claim. Colonial Penn filed for declaratory judg-
argument that offers under Rule 68 are irrevocable); Fisher v. Stolaruk Corp., 110 F.R.C. 74,
75 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (stating that offers under Rule 68 are irrevocable).
77. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
78. See Storm Plastics, Inc. v. United States, 770 F.2d 148, 155 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding
error in district court judge's personal appraisal of specific fishing lures without hearing
evidence); Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, 561 F.2d 494, 510 n.38 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating
that courts normally do not travel outside the record of the case).
79. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 157 (1968) (taking notice of prior
Supreme Court opinions for description of event common to both cases); Dowalski v. Gagne,
914 F.2d 299, 305-06 (1st Cir. 1990) (approving district court's notice of defendant's prior
conviction though no certified copy of conviction was introduced into evidence); In re Calder,
907 F.2d 953, 955 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) (approving bankruptcy court's notice of Calder's
financial statements in refusing to discharge Calder's debts); United States v. Hope, 906 F.2d
254, 260 (7th Cir. 1990) (considering record of state court, not on appellate record, to
determine whether defendant actually was convicted of previous criminal conduct); Sinalao
Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 864 F.2d 1475, 1479 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (taking
notice of public data compilations to refute party's claim that they would suffer unreasonable
delay by going to trial in state court); Marshall v. Bramer, 828 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1987)
(approving trial court's notice of criminal record of Klu Klux Klan to draw inference, for
discovery purposes, of Klan's propensity for racial violence); United States v. Author Services,
804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986) (approving district court's notice of district court's own
records from prior case); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Cullen, 791 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.
1986) (examining du Pont's complaint in state court, not on appellate record, to determine
what type of action du Pont originally filed); Coney v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir.
1984) (taking notice of state court proceedings, not on appellate record, to determine whether
state court heard particular issue); Green v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 699 F.2d 364, 369
(7th Cir. 1983) (considering Green's extensive litigation record, not on appellate record, to
determine whether to enjoin Green from filing civil actions or appeals before obtaining leave
of appropriate court).
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ment in federal district court, claiming that the Coils had committed arson.
Colonial Penn was unable to discover conclusive evidence of arson, however,
and offered the Coils judgment for $50,000, pursuant to Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Coils verbally accepted the offer and
endorsed the check, but the defendants never served Colonial Penn with
written notice, in accord with Rule 68, until after Colonial Penn had
rescinded its offer.
Seven days after Colonial Penn extended its offer of judgment, the
claims examiner for Colonial Penn received a telephone call from the aunt
of the Coils' daughter's boyfriend, who lived in the Coils' home at the time
of the fire. The boyfriend had informed his aunt that he had helped the
Coils intentionally set fire to the house. Upon learning this information,
Colonial Penn immediately revoked its offer of judgment.
On the same day, the boyfriend's aunt also informed the local sheriff's
office of the Coils' actions. The Coils were arrested and charged with arson.
After the federal district court had ruled that Colonial Penn could not
rescind its offer of judgment, the Coils pleaded guilty to the criminal charge.
The guilty pleas, therefore, were not a part of the district court's record
before the Fourth Circuit.
In Colonial Penn the district court held that offers pursuant to Rule
68 are irrevocable for ten days subsequent to the offer. The district court
found that the defendants properly had accepted Colonial Penn's offer of
judgment when the defendants signed the check. The district court distin-
guished Rule 68 judgments from judgments actually procured by trial.
According to the district court, when parties submit their fate to a court,
that court has the power to correct itself after it has rendered a judgement.
Although Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically allows
federal courts to review judgments of cases that go to trial if the cases were
possibly affected by a party's fraud, the district court refused to consider
the new information in Colonial Penn. The court reasoned that, because
the parties agreed to a judgment among themselves rather than resorting to
the court, the court subsequently could not reopen the case.
Colonial Penn appealed the district court's holding enforcing Colonial
Penn's offer of judgment. On appeal, Colonial Penn also moved to include
in the appellate record the Coils' guilty pleas to the criminal charge of
arson. The Fourth Circuit first addressed whether it should take notice of
the Coils' guilty pleas in state court. The Coils argued that the guilty pleas
were irrelevant and should not be included in the record because Colonial
Penn had withdrawn its offer before the Coils pleaded guilty.
The Fourth Circuit, however, found that the Coils' admission of guilt
was directly relevant because the criminal proceedings in state court involved
the same property and issues as those on appeal. The Fourth Circuit found
that the contents of the state court's records, though not contained in the
appellate record, were sufficiently reliable for judicial notice purposes pur-
suant to Rule 201(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In the interest of
justice, the Fourth Circuit took notice of the guilty pleas.
The Fourth Circuit then addressed whether a party may withdraw an
offer of judgment within ten days of the offer in accord with Rule 68.
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While noting that several courts, without discussion, have found that Rule
68 offers cannot be withdrawn for ten days the Fourth Circuit observed
that exceptional factual situations may merit recision of such offers. The
Colonial Penn court readily determined that a fair result in the case
mandated that Colonial Penn, on proper grounds, could revoke its offer.
The Fourth Circuit compared the case at bar to a situation where the
fraudulent parties had procured a judgment. In such a situation, the Fourth
Circuit noted that under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the insurance carrier could move successfully to vacate the judgment. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the compelling factual circumstances in Co-
lonial Penn gave the court implicit authority to revoke the Rule 68 offer
to carry out justice. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that courts have
supervisory authority under Rule 68 to vacate a settlement. Accordingly the
Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with the instruction
to vacate the settlement if the district court found that the Coils procured
the settlement through fraud.
The Fourth Circuit is the only United States Circuit Court of Appeals
that has addressed squarely whether Rule 68 offers may be revoked in
appropriate circumstances. In Radecki v. Amoco Oil Co., 858 F.2d 397
(8th Cir. 1988), the Eighth Circuit assumed, for the sake of argument, that
Rule 68 prohibits revocation of an offer of judgement. In Radecki, however,
the Eighth Circuit never directly addressed the issue, because the court
characterized the offering party's subsequent offer as a clarification of the
original offer rather than a revocation. The Radecki court concluded that
courts should characterize, if possible, settlement communications subse-
quent to a party's offer as clarifications rather than revocations.
The Colonial Penn decision is consistent with the purpose of Rule 68
to encourage settlements.A0 The Fourth Circuit's decision places Rule 68
settlements on equal footing with final court judgments in cases of fraud,
because the court will open up both kinds of judgments when one party
has perpetuated a fraud. Consequently, parties should be more amenable
to settlement under Rule 68 with the knowledge that the opposing party's
fraudulent behavior may be grounds for rescinding the agreement.
The Fourth Circuit's judicial notice of the defendants' guilty pleas in
state court also is in accord with the decision of other federal appellate
courts consiaering the issue. Although the Fourth Circuit stated that federal
appellate courts rarely take notice of facts outside the record, federal courts
frequently invoke Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to take
notice of a reliably accurate fact.
The Ethics in Government Act (the Act), 28 U.S.C. sections 591-598
(1989), provides a mechanism for investigating and prosecuting certain
executive branch officers. The Act seeks to avoid the bias that could result
from the Justice Department's prosecution of high-ranking executive branch
80. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) (stating that purpose of Rule 68 is to
encourage settlements); Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981) (same).
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officers by requiring that the Attorney General appoint an independent
counsel to prosecute any case involving certain executive branch officers.
Under Section 594(a) of the Act, the independent counsel may "exercise all
investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers" which the Attorney
General and Department of Justice normally exercise. In recent years, courts
have explored the extent of the independent counsel's powers under the
Act.81 In Appeal of U.S. by Atty. Gen., 887 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1990), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit further defined the
limits of the independent counsel's powers and determined, specifically, how
the independent counsel's functions should coexist with the Attorney Ge-
neral's functions.
In Appeal of U.S. by Atty. Gen. the Fourth Circuit considered whether
the Act grants independent counsel the sole authority to appeal a judicial
decision under section 7 of the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA), 18 U.S.C. App. sections 1-16 (1982). Under the CIPA, the Attorney
General may bring an interlocutory appeal from a district court's refusal
to allow the government to substitute unclassified summaries in place of
classified evidence at trial. Because the independent counsel can exercise all
prosecutorial powers of the Attorney General in cases involving high-ranking
executive branch officers, this case forced the Fourth Circuit to determine
how the Attorney General's mission to protect national security under the
CIPA affected the independence of the independent counsel under the Act.
The events leading to the appeal began when a former CIA officer,
Joseph F. Fernandez, allegedly made false statements to officials investi-
gating the "Iran-Contra" affair. A federal grand jury indicted Fernandez
on two counts of giving false official statements and two counts of ob-
structing proceedings. Because Fernandez was a high-ranking executive
branch officer, the Attorney General appointed independent counsel to
prosecute Fernandez. Pursuant to section 5(a) of the CIPA, Fernandez gave
the independent counsel notice that he planned to use classified information
during his trial defense. At a pretrial hearing, the district court for the
Eastern District of Virginia found that some of the classified items were
relevant to Fernandez's defense and, therefore, admitted the items for use
in trial. Subsequently, the independent counsel, pursuant to section 6(c)(1)
of the CIPA, moved to substitute unclassified summaries for the classified
items. The district court rejected the independent counsel's motion for the
use of summaries.
81. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that appointment of independent
counsel pursuant to Ethics in Government Act is constitutional and stating that "[tihe functions
of the independent counsel include conducting grand jury proceedings and other investigations,
participating in civil and criminal court proceedings and litigation, and appealing any decision
in any case in which the counsel participates in an official capacity"); U.S. v. Poindexter, 725
F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1989) (stating that independent counsel is by nature independent of
Attorney General and may not always be able to follow Department of Justice policies).
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The independent counsel then requested that the Attorney General file
an affidavit under section 6(e) of the CIPA to block Fernandez' use of the
classified items. A section 6(e) affidavit absolutely prohibits the use of
classified documents at trial. Once the Attorney General files a section 6(e)
affidavit, the district court must decide whether to allow the trial to proceed
without the forbidden evidence or whether to dismiss the case altogether.
The Attorney General refused to file the affidavit. Instead, the Attorney
General filed an interlocutory appeal under CIPA section 7(a), alleging that
the district court's ruling against using unclassified summaries instead of
classified information was improper.
The independent counsel challenged the Attorney General's right to
appeal, arguing that the Act grants the independent counsel the sole au-
thority to appeal under section 7 of the CIPA. The Attorney General
alleged, however, that the Attorney General possessed the exclusive right to
file an appeal, even when independent counsel was prosecuting a case. The
Attorney General contended that a single decision maker should decide
whether to disclose classified information, whether to move that unclassified
summaries be substituted for classified information, whether to appeal
adverse decisions on substitution, and whether to jeopardize the prosecution
by filing a 6(e) affidavit. The Attorney General argued that if the inde-
pendent counsel is given the sole authority to file appeals, the Attorney
General must either do nothing or put the entire prosection at risk by filing
a section 6(e) affidavit.
To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit looked to the statutory language
of section 7(a) of the CIPA and section 594(a) of the Act. Section 7(a) of
the CIPA gives the United States the authority to appeal from adverse
CIPA orders. Section 594(a) of the Act gives the independent counsel,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the power and independent
authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers
of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General. The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that because section 594(a) granted the independent counsel power
to exercise all the prosecutorial functions of the Attorney General, the
independent counsel could exercise the Attorney General's function of
appealing adverse decisions under the section 7(a) of the CIPA. The Fourth
Circuit further reasoned that the independent counsel's power, notwithstand-
ing any other provision of the law, meant that the independent counsel's
prosecution powers should not be limited by other statutes, including the
CIPA. The Fourth Circuit stated that the only exception to section 594(a)'s
broad grant of prosecutorial power to the independent counsel is contained
within section 594 itself. Section 594 provides that only the Attorney General
may authorize wiretaps. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that when
the Act requires the appointment of an independent counsel, the independent
counsel can exercise all other investigative and prosecutorial functions of
the Attorney General.
The Fourth Circuit next analyzed whether appealing an adverse ruling
under the CIPA is a prosecutorial function and therefore within the juris-
diction of the independent counsel. After determining that the Act classifies
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